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Note
Credit Rating Agencies and the First
Amendment: Applying Constitutional
Journalistic Protections to Subprime Mortgage
Litigation
Theresa Nagy*
"The story of the credit-rating agencies is the story of a co-
lossal failure."'
Although Representative Henry A. Waxman's statement
may be an exaggeration, the biased, overvalued appraisal of
risky securities by rating agencies has undermined the entire
United States financial system. 2 The agencies' failure to accu-
rately evaluate structured-finance risks contributed to the
housing market collapse and a spike in foreclosure activity,
thereby triggering a global financial crisis. 3 The finance indus-
try has faced great political and public hostility for its role in
precipitating this severe economic downturn, and the backlash
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1. Amit R. Paley, Credit-Rating Firms Grilled over Conflicts: Risks Were
Known, Documents Show, WASH. PoST, Oct. 23, 2008, at Al (quoting Repre-
sentative Henry A. Waxman, the Chairman of the House Committee on Over-
sight and Government Reform).
2. See id. ("Executives at the country's leading credit-rating companies,
whose optimistic assessments of risky investments helped fuel the financial
meltdown, have privately acknowledged for more than a year that conflicts of
interest contributed to the industry's failures, according to internal company
documents... .").
3. See DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE U.S. FINANCIAL
CRISIS: THE GLOBAL DIMENSION WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 9-11
(2009), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdflglobaleconcrs
.pdf.
140
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
against the industry will only intensify as more Americans lose
their jobs and homes.4
Accordingly, a surge of litigation flowing from the financial
crisis has begun to flood the United States judicial system.5
Subprime mortgage lenders were the first targets of the law-
suits focused on the structured-finance industry.6 But angry
investors are now taking aim at the rating agencies for their
role in the crisis,7 suing the three major United States credit
rating agencies-Moody's Investment Service (Moody's), Stan-
dard & Poor's (S&P), and Fitch Ratings (Fitch)-for giving in-
flated evaluations to subprime residential mortgage-backed se-
curities.8  In short, these agencies' ratings greatly
underestimated the risks associated with subprime securities.9
Since millions of investors relied on these purportedly "inde-
pendent, objective assessments,"10 they lost billions of dollars
when the market collapsed."
Despite harboring enormous influence in all areas of the
financial market,12 rating agencies have deflected liability for
4. Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-Structured Finance and
Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 53, 79 (2009).
5. Id. ("As of July 2008, at least 132 subprime and [structured-finance]
related class action lawsuits have been initiated in the [United States].").
6. Id. Most of these defendants rendered themselves judgment proof,
however, by either closing their businesses completely or filing for bankruptcy.
Id.
7. See generally Martha Graybow, Credit Rating Agencies Fending Off
Lawsuits from Subprime Meltdown, INS. J., July 14, 2008, http://www
.insurancejournal.cominews/national/2008/07/14/91841.htm (providing an
overview of recent litigation against rating agencies).
8. Id.; see, e.g., Complaint at 2, In re Moody's Corp. Sec. Litig., 612 F.
Supp. 2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 07 CIV 8375) (charging that Moody's as-
signed "excessively high ratings to bonds backed by risky subprime mortgag-
es"); Complaint for Violation of Federal Securities Laws at 1, Ind. Laborers
Pension Fund v. Fimalac, S.A., No. 1:08 CV 05994 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. voluntarily
dismissed Oct. 3, 2008) (charging that Fitch failed to disclose that its ratings
of residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations
were based on misleading information); Consolidated Class Action Complaint
for Securities Fraud at 1-4, Reese v. Bahash, 248 F.R.D. 58 (D.D.C. 2008) (No.
1:07-cv-01530-CKK) (charging that S&P assigned misleading ratings to sub-
prime residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obliga-
tions).
9. See Gretchen Morgenson, House Panel Scrutinizes Ratings Firms,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at B5.
10. Id. (quoting Representative Henry A. Waxman, the Chairman of the
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform).
11. See NANTO, supra note 3, at 11 fig.2.
12. Stdphane Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating
Agencies: The Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach, 51 McGILL L.J. 617, 621
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their inaccurate ratings 13 by claiming that their core function is
journalism-that they serve to gather and analyze newsworthy
financial information and then disseminate opinions about this
information to the public.14 Therefore, the rating agencies claim
protection under the First Amendment as a matter of free
speech and freedom of the press. 15 A number of courts have
agreed with this position and applied the Supreme Court's ac-
tual malice standard for journalistic liability1 6 in determining
the agencies' liability for the accuracy of their credit ratings.17
Consequently, plaintiffs generally have been unsuccessful in
suits against these agencies 18-a reality that can only prolong
the agencies' deficient performances and their failure to priorit-
ize investors' interests over their own profits. 19 Of course, new
government regulations and the agencies' own initiatives may
enhance the integrity of the rating process, 20 but these prospec-
tive actions offer little comfort to the millions of investors al-
ready suffering in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis.21
This Note argues that the First Amendment should not
shield rating agencies from legal liability for their grossly inac-
curate ratings of residential mortgage-backed securities. Part I
provides an overview of the role rating agencies played in the
subprime mortgage crisis and describes their past success in
defending lawsuits using a First Amendment shield. Part II ar-
(2006) (describing rating agencies as having become "central institutions in
financial markets").
13. Id. at 642 (noting that liability "plays a limited role in disciplining rat-
ing agencies operating in the American markets").
14. Gregory W. Smith, The Deterioration of Investor Tools and the Result-
ing Fiduciary Challenges, 57 J. GOV'T FIN. MGMT. 26, 29 (2008).
15. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishing that "Congress
shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press").
16. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
17. Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies
in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 352-53 (2006).
18. Id. at 353.
19. See Paley, supra note 1, at Al.
20. See, e.g., Deven Sharma, Op-Ed, The Market Alone Won't Make It,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, at A19 (agreeing that new regulations may be ne-
cessary in these "unprecedented times" and stating that "[w]e at Standard &
Poor's agree with President Obama's call for an open and transparent finan-
cial system that speaks in plain language investors can understand"); STAN-
DARD & POOR'S, DESCRIPTION OF NEW ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN RATINGS
PROCESS AND BETTER SERVE MARKETS 1-10 (2008), http://www2.standard
andpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/LeadershipActionDetails.pdf (describing new
policies that Standard & Poor's has adopted to improve the transparency, ac-
curacy, and credibility of their credit ratings).
21. See Paley, supra note 1, at Al.
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gues that various characteristics of the agencies distinguish
them from the traditional press and thus render the First
Amendment inapplicable to cases involving the accuracy of
these agencies' ratings. Part III suggests that courts should
refuse to automatically afford rating agencies First Amend-
ment protection in future litigation related to the inaccurate
rating of residential mortgage-backed securities. Instead,
courts should use a three-factor test to determine if an agency
actually qualifies for constitutional protection. This Note con-
cludes that the judicial system must hold rating agencies ac-
countable for their role in the subprime mortgage crisis. Even
though the legislature also needs to increase regulation of the
credit rating industry in order to prevent future deceptive and
unjust practices within it, Moody's, S&P, and Fitch should not
escape legal liability for the irreparable damage they have
caused to millions of investors and the global financial market.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES' ROLE
IN THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THEIR USE
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO DEFEND AGAINST
LIABILITY
Rating agencies emerged in the financial market at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, 22 likely to help level the in-
formation imbalance that inherently exists in lending relation-
ships. 23 Accordingly, they have evolved with the constantly
changing economy over the past one hundred years into increa-
singly influential market participants. 24 The primary function
of rating agencies is to assess "the creditworthiness of compa-
nies and public entities that issue debt."2 5 The agencies claim
22. See TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN
BOND RATING AGENCIES AND THE POLITICs OF CREDITWORTHINESS 24 (2005).
23. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 632
(1999) ("Rating agencies may exist because of information asymmetry between
debt issuers and investors. Information asymmetry exists in markets where
sellers have superior information to buyers about product quality, yet cannot
costlessly convey this information to buyers."); Amy K. Rhodes, The Role of the
SEC in the Regulation of the Rating Agencies: Well-Placed Reliance or Free-
Market Interference?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 293, 294 (1996) (describing how
rating agencies create "an efficient interface between investors and issuers"
that reduces the cost of securities research for individual investors).
24. See Rousseau, supra note 12, at 627.
25. Amy Borrus et al., The Credit Raters: How They Work and How They
Might Work Better, BUS. WK., Apr. 8, 2002, at 38; see also Pinto, supra note 17,
at 341.
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to "make judgments on the 'future ability and willingness of an
issuer to make timely payments of principal and interest on a
security over the life of the instrument.' 2 6 The agencies grade
the issuer to provide investors with ratings, 27 which range from
an extremely low credit risk to a highly speculative invest-
ment.28 An important distinction is made between investment
and speculative grades because 1930s securities legislation
prevents fiduciaries from investing in bonds rated below a cer-
tain level.29 Until recently, Moody's, S&P, and Fitch benefited
from an oligopolistic market structure, as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) had designated only these three
agencies as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organiza-
tions (NRSROs).30
Due to the nature of the industry and the market, most
scholars argue that the success of these powerful ratings agen-
cies depends on their integrity, dependability, and reliability.31
26. Timothy J. Sinclair, Passing Judgment: Credit Rating Processes as
Regulatory Mechanisms of Governance in the Emerging World Order, in GLO-
BALIZATION AND ECONOMY: GLOBALIZING FINANCE AND THE NEW GLOBAL
ECONOMY 248, 253 (Paul James & Heikki Patomaki eds., 2007) (citation omit-
ted).
27. See Borrus et al., supra note 25, at 38. The agencies utilize a letter-
based rating system, in which "AAA," the highest score, is awarded to finan-
cially stable companies and "D" is given to companies in default. DAVID F.
HAWKINS ET AL., RATING INDUSTRIAL BONDS 25-29 (1983); Rhodes, supra note
23, at 303 n.41.
28. Frank Packer, Credit Ratings and the Japanese Corporate Bond Mar-
ket, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 139,
140 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002). Generally, anything below a "BBB"
rating is considered noninvestment grade or a "junk bond." See Mark Carey, A
Guide to Choosing Absolute Bank Capital Requirements, in RATINGS, RATING
AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra, at 117, 134.
29. JEROME S. FONS, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., SPECIAL COMMENT:
TRACING THE ORIGINS OF "INVESTMENT GRADE" 2 (2004), available at http://
www.moodys.com.br/brasil/pdf/InvGradeOrigins.pdf (explaining how during
the Great Depression the United States Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency required bank holdings of publicly rated bonds to be rated at investment
grade or better). The regulation specified that "bonds rated [investment grade]
may be carried at cost, but defaulted bonds and those of lower ratings had to
be marked to market." Id.
30. For a description of the structure of the credit rating business and the
significance of the NRSRO designation, see generally Claire A. Hill, Regulat-
ing the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004). There are currently ten
agencies designated as NRSROs. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Credit Rating
Agencies-NRSROs, http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2009).
31. See Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RAT-
ING AGENCIES, AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 28, at 65, 67.
But see Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H.
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the failure of these agencies
to live up to the public's expectation of objective, accurate, and
independent investigation of issuer creditworthiness has
spurred public outrage, 32 spawned numerous lawsuits,33 and
led to new regulations. 34 An overview of the rating agencies'
role in the subprime mortgage crisis and past litigation involv-
ing the agencies' reliability provides insight into the future le-
gal challenges facing Moody's, S&P, and Fitch.
A. RATINGS OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
The ratings of many residential mortgage-backed securities
have become a source of controversy and contention in the fal-
lout of the financial crisis. Residential mortgage-backed securi-
ties are defined as "bonds issued by large financial institutions
backed by pools of individual home mortgages." 35 Federal agen-
cies, government-sponsored enterprises, and private businesses
purchase mortgages and assemble them into pools. 3 6 The pur-
chasing entity issues securities that represent the principal and
interest payments on the individual loans within the pool. 3 7
Since default on a single loan does not significantly affect the
value of the aggregated pool, investor risk is decreased. 38 Inves-
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 1, 2-3 (2008)
(statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20081022102221.pdf (repeating claims by Ray McDaniel, CEO of Moody's, that
the market "penalizes quality" and citing an S&P employee document that
claimed "[a security] could be structured by cows and we would rate it").
32. See Paley, supra note 1, at Al.
33. Graybow, supra note 7.
34. See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59342, 74 Fed. Reg. 6456, 6465-
67, 6483 (Feb. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/34 -59342fr.pdf (including a ban on rating
a security after the agency has made recommendations regarding the issuer's
structure of the finance product, a restriction on rater participation in fee dis-
cussion, and significant new disclosure obligations for rating agencies).
35. Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney General Andrew M.
Cuomo, Attorney General Cuomo Announces Landmark Reform Agreements
with the Nation's Three Principal Credit Rating Agencies (June 5, 2008),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media-center/2008/jun/june5a_- 08.html.
36. See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKT. ASS'N, INCLUDING JUMBOS IN TBA-
ELIGIBLE POOLS WILL RESULT IN HIGHER COSTS FOR BORROWERS 1 (2008),
http://www.sifma.org/capital-markets/docs/TBA-Pools-2008-MBS-Brief.pdf.
37. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://
www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
38. See Derrick M. Land, Residential Mortgage Securitization and Con-
sumer Welfare, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 208, 209 (2007).
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tors only face serious problems when numerous mortgages in
the pool default,39 as occurred in the United States beginning in
2006.40 In 2007 alone, 2.2 million American properties were
subject to a foreclosure filing.41 This foreclosure crisis triggered
the global market meltdown of 2008.42
Although the enormous risk involved in residential mort-
gage-backed securities investment is evident today, rating
agencies had given many of these securities investment-grade
ratings. 43 In order to rate the securities, the agencies looked at
characteristics of each individual mortgage in the pool, the pro-
posed structure of the aggregated pool, and the proposed degree
of credit enhancement. 44 Using this information, the agencies
completed a series of analyses and assigned a rating to the se-
curities.45 Due to risk distribution and diversification, the
agencies typically graded the aggregated pool much higher
than they would have rated the individual loans.46 The agen-
cies assigned "AAA" ratings to almost all residential mortgage-
backed securities. 47 These high ratings promoted investment in
these securities. 48 When the number of defaults on subprime
mortgages rapidly increased, major banks and financial institu-
tions-key investors in residential mortgage-backed securi-
ties-reported losses in the hundreds of billions.49 Bank fail-
ures triggered extreme stock market volatility, which decreased
stockholder wealth by trillions of dollars and sunk the economy
into a deep recession.50
39. See id.
40. See Vikas Bajaj, Foreclosures Rose as Delinquencies Eased in Quarter,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at B8.
41. Number of Foreclosures Soared in 2007, MSNBC, Jan. 29, 2008, http://
www.msnbc.msn.comlid/22893703.
42. See NANTO, supra note 3, at 9-11.
43. See Unterman, supra note 4, at 69-70.
44. STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE
COMMISSION STAFF'S EXAMINATION OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 7
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 SEC REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2008/craexaminationO7O8O8.pdf.
45. Id. An arranger could typically appeal an unfavorable ratings deci-
sion. Id. at 9. Also remarkable is the fact that the rating agency received com-
pensation only if the rating was issued. Id.
46. Land, supra note 38, at 211.
47. See Unterman, supra note 4, at 69-70.
48. See id. at 95-96.
49. See Gretchen Morgenson, The End of Banking as We Know It, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, at Bl.
50. See Vikas Bajaj, Markets Limp into 2009 After a Bruising Year, N.Y.
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Both the government and private investors are seeking an-
swers and amends for the rating agencies' role in the subprime
mortgage crisis. A prime example of such recourse is the re-
cently filed action in California Public Employees' Retirement
System v. Moody's.51 The California Public Employees' Retire-
ment System (CalPERS), the nation's largest state-run pension
fund, had invested in structured investment vehicles that were
largely comprised of subprime mortgages. 52 All of the major
agencies had given the securities the highest possible rating. 53
CalPERS's complaint alleges that the agencies had misrepre-
sented the true high-risk nature of the underlying mortgages
as the ratings "ultimately proved to be wildly inaccurate and
unreasonably high" and that the agencies' rating methodology
was "seriously flawed in conception and incompetently ap-
plied." 5 4 CalPERS claims to have lost one billion dollars and
seeks to hold the ratings agencies liable for this substantial de-
cline in its 1.3 billion-dollar investment.55 The plaintiffs in Cal-
ifornia Public Employees' Retirement System v. Moody's and
those who bring future suits face a difficult challenge since the
rating agencies have previously found protection under the
First Amendment.
B. PRIOR LITIGATION INVOLVING THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
Prior litigation involving the rating agencies stemmed from
charges opposite the one underlying recent complaints. That is,
earlier lawsuits accused the agencies of unfairly and incorrectly
rating the issuer too low and causing demand for the stock to
drop without proper cause. 56 Although today's claims are dif-
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at Bl.
51. Complaint for Negligent Misrepresentation Under Common Law and
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1709 and 1710 and Negligent Interference with Prospective
Econ. Advantage, Cal. Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Moody's Corp., No.
CGC-09-490241 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. July 9, 2009) [hereinafter Cal-
PERS Complaint]. S&P's parent company and Fitch are also named defen-
dants in this case. Id.
52. Jacqueline Bell, CalPERS Sues Rating Agencies over $1B in Losses,
LAW360, July 15, 2009, http://www.law360.com/articles/111413.
53. Id.
54. CalPERS Complaint, supra note 51, at 1.
55. Bell, supra note 52.
56. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 751 (1985) (addressing allegations that a rating agency graded a con-
struction contractor's securities too low in a private rating); Jefferson County
Sch. Dist. v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 850-51 (10th Cir.
2009] 147
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ferent, the principles of the arguments on both sides remain the
same. This fact may be disconcerting for those bringing suit,
because the rating agencies have been extremely successful in
avoiding liability based on inaccurate ratings.57 One reason for
this success is the Securities Act Rule, which shields the rating
agencies from liability for everything except fraud under feder-
al securities law.58 If investors cannot establish that the agen-
cies acted fraudulently, they must look to other theories of lia-
bility.59
In the few cases in which the rating agencies faced tort
claims, "the only common element . . . [has been] that the rat-
ing agencies win."60 The agencies' success has often been based
on standard defenses, such as lack of duty or unreasonable re-
liance. 61 Even if plaintiffs are able to overcome conventional
tort defenses, the agencies can still raise a First Amendment
defense based on the constitutional protection of commercial
speech. 62 The Supreme Court has held that speech driven by
profit may be constitutionally protected, but "false and mislead-
ing commercial speech is not entitled to any First Amendment
protection." 63 The rating agencies have been successful in nu-
merous cases because courts have likened the agencies to jour-
nalists and the ratings to opinions, and, under this framework,
ratings categorically cannot be "false or misleading."64 Courts
have not yet conclusively tested the agencies' use of journalistic
1999) (ruling on claims brought by county that the credit rating had provided
inaccurately low and unsolicited public ratings).
57. See Unterman, supra note 4, at 98; see also Kenneth C. Kettering, Se-
curitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Develop-
ment, 29 CARDOzO L. REV. 1553, 1687-93 (2008) (discussing rating agencies'
liability for their ratings).
58. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOv'T AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL
OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 82 (2002)
[hereinafter FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT]; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2007)
(mandating an express exemption for NRSROs from liability under § 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933).
59. See Kettering, supra note 57, at 1689.
60. Id. at 1688 (citing Partnoy, supra note 31, at 79).
61. Id. at 1691; see also, e.g., Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Co., 168 F.3d 331, 336
(7th Cir. 1999) (holding reliance on ratings was unreasonable); First Equity
Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding
parties not to be in privity).
62. Kettering, supra note 57, at 1689.
63. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 593 (1980).
64. Kettering, supra note 57, at 1689.
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protections, 66 but there are currently two methods used to re-
solve such cases. The first approach adopts a general actual
malice standard as defined by New York Times v. Sullivan.66
The second approach is specific to rating agencies and exempli-
fied by the two-prong test set forth by In re Fitch.67 The court's
choice of standard has a significant impact on the outcome of
the agency's case. 68
1. Actual Malice Standard
While not specifically deciding the First Amendment issue
as applied to rating agencies, the Supreme Court held in New
York Times v. Sullivan that a publisher is not liable for a false
or misleading statement about "matters of public concern" un-
less it made the statement with "actual malice."69 In the land-
mark case, Justice Brennan sought to avoid "a forbidden intru-
sion on the field of free expression" in a libel action brought by
a city commissioner. 70 The Supreme Court found that an actual
malice standard applies to false statements about public fig-
ures and matters where the statements are principally pro-
tected by the First Amendment.71 The Court sought to preserve
65. Id.
66. Id. (describing the standard in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 280 (1964)).
67. See Larry P. Ellsworth & Ishan K. Bhabha, A New Front in Subprime
Litigation: Can Rating Agencies Be Held Liable?, LAW360, Aug. 12, 2008,
http://www.law360.com/articles/65936 (describing the standard in Am. Say.
Bank v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, 109-10 (2d
Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).
68. Compare Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (providing a blanket protection
to rating agencies absent "actual malice"), with In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d at
109-10 (noting the absence of First Amendment protection when a rating
agency's actions are based on client needs).
69. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49
(1974).
70. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285.
71. Id. at 279, 282, 285; see also Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50 ("At the heart of
the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the
free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.").
Some courts have found the reports of the credit rating agencies to constitute
matters of public interest and concern. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv-
ative & ERISA Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 829-30 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("The cre-
dit rating reports regarding Enron by national credit rating agencies were not
private or confidential, but distributed 'to the world' and were related to the
creditworthiness of a powerful public corporation that operated international-
ly."); County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Co., 245 B.R. 151, 155 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(finding the county's debt offerings a matter of concern as the plaintiffs alleged
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the "breathing space" that it found essential for freedom of ex-
pression. 72 Because plaintiffs must show that a publisher had
knowledge that the statement in controversy was "false" or
acted "with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,"
the Sullivan standard is difficult to overcome. 73
Rating agencies have successfully argued for courts to ap-
ply the actual malice standard to cases involving ratings liabili-
ty.7 4 For example, in County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Co., the
claim that S&P, a subsidiary of McGraw Hill Company,
breached its duty to competently provide ratings was subject to
the actual malice standard.75 The district court found that "the
First Amendment protects S&P's preparation and publication
of its ratings" 76 because the cause of action "impacted expres-
sion" and involved "matters of public concern."77 A similar re-
sult was reached in the aftermath of the Enron scandal. In In
re Enron, the district court rejected a blanket protection for the
rating agencies, but considered the agencies' First Amendment
argument.78 In examining all of the relevant information, in-
cluding the alleged facts, context, nature of the content, and
language of the statement, the court determined that the credit
ratings were a combination of "subjective opinions" and "verifi-
able facts."7 9 It held that the ratings were matters of "public
concern . . . even if negligently prepared" and thus constitu-
tionally protected.80
Additionally, although the issuer in In re Enron had re-
tained the agencies to rate its bonds, the court found that this
privity and conflict of interest did not preclude First Amend-
ment protection for the rating agencies.81 Some courts contend
the rating agency's actions caused them to incur 500 million dollars worth of
debt).
72. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 280.
74. See Kettering, supra note 57, at 1689.
75. McGraw Hill Co., 245 B.R. at 156 (granting the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on breach of contract and professional negligence claims
since the county was unable to show that S&P had acted "with knowledge that
the statement was false or with reckless disregard for whether or not it was
true" in rating the county's debt securities (quoting Falwell, 485 U.S. at 52)).
76. Id. at 157.
77. Id. at 155 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280).
78. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d
742, 829-30 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
79. Id. at 825.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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that the rating of securities generally constitutes a "matter of
'public concern"' and bar recovery on a showing of anything less
than recklessness. 82 These courts fear the chilling effect that
would follow such liability and maintain that the "[F]irst
[A]mendment's concern for the free flow of commercial informa-
tion"83 should trump the "state's interest in compensating rely-
ing investors."84 However, the Supreme Court has noted that
"[s]ome tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigor-
ous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in re-
dressing wrongful injury."85 The Second Circuit took this rec-
ognition a step further and formulated a concrete assessment
that includes consideration of issuer payment as a factor in as-
sessing rating agency liability.
2. In re Fitch Standard
In In re Fitch, the Second Circuit created a new test to spe-
cifically determine if rating agencies are entitled to protections
reserved for the press. 86 Fitch was a nonparty to the civil suit
American Savings Bank v. UBS PaineWebber and sought to
quash a subpoena under New York's Shield Law.8 7 The court
considered two factors in determining whether it should desig-
nate a rating agency as a member of the press and thus pro-
tected under the shield law.88 First, it looked at issuer payment
and carefully considered whether the agency covered only se-
curities transactions for which it received compensation. 89
Second, the court examined the agency's level of activity in
structuring the transaction to see if it was a typical media rela-
tionship. 90
82. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d
848, 856 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gregory Husisian, What Standard of
Care Should Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rat-
ing Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 460 (1990)).
83. In re Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d. at 824 n.82.
84. Id.
85. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
86. In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
87. Id. (describing how the subpoena sought disclosure of Fitch's commu-
nications with the defendant regarding the ratings of securities that the de-
fendant had offered the plaintiff).
88. Id.; see also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b)-(c) (McKinney 1992) (ex-
empting professional journalists and newscasters from contempt charges with
an absolute protection for confidential news and a qualified protection for non-
confidential stories).
89. In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d at 109-10.
90. Id. at 110-11.
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Addressing the first element, the court determined that
Fitch rarely rated transactions other than those of its clients,
unlike the financial media, which would cover anything deemed
newsworthy. 91 It contrasted Fitch with S&P and discussed In re
Pan Am, a case that found that S&P had rated nearly all pub-
lic-debt issues regardless of issuer payment. 92 The In re Fitch
court found Fitch's information gathering and disseminating
practices to be based on client needs rather than on a judgment
of newsworthiness. 93 The court weighed this factor against
Fitch in that agency's assertion of the journalist's privilege. 94
For the second element, the court discussed Fitch's active
role in planning the transactions that it analyzes and its close
relationships with the companies that it rates.95 Such a role is
inconsistent with the traditional media, as a regular journalist
would rarely have such a close level of involvement with the
source of his or her reporting.96 In light of the two factors, the
court determined that Fitch did not fit New York's professional-
journalist standard and was not entitled to assert the newsga-
thering privilege.97 It left open the question as to whether a rat-
ing agency could ever claim the state's shield law protections 98
but set a clear precedent for a fact-specific inquiry into the is-
91. Id. at 109.
92. Id. (citing Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.),
161 B.R. 577, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
93. Id. at 110.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 110-11.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 111. The New York statute at issue in the case defines "profes-
sional journalist" as:
[O]ne who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing,
collecting, writing, editing, filing, taping or photographing of news in-
tended for a newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association or
wire service or other professional medium or agency which has as one
of its regular functions the processing and researching of news in-
tended for dissemination to the public; such person shall be someone
performing said function either as a regular employee or as one oth-
erwise professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood with such me-
dium of communication.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6) (McKinney 1992).
98. In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d at 111. ("For the sake of clarity, we note that
we are not deciding the general status of a credit rating agency like Fitch un-
der New York's Shield Law: Whether Fitch, or one of its rivals, could ever be
entitled to assert the newsgathering privilege is a question we leave for anoth-
er day.").
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sue that disfavored an extension of journalists' privileges and
protections to the agencies. 99
Like the Second Circuit in In re Fitch, other courts have
been reluctant to grant media protections to rating agencies
where the issuer had retained and paid a fee to the agency or
the agency was otherwise significantly involved in the transac-
tion.100 Generally, journalists and editors do not receive com-
pensation from the subject of their opinion or directly partici-
pate in the subject's activities, unlike the dominant rating
agencies. 101 The agencies are almost always paid their fees by
the issuer of securities applying for the rating, which "raises
the possibility that the issuer will use, or the rating agency will
perceive, monetary pressure to improve the rating."102 While
not specifically following the two prongs of the In re Fitch test,
Commercial Financial Services v. Arthur Andersen illustrates
the importance many courts place on these issues. 103
The Commercial Financial Services court held that the
First Amendment did not protect bond ratings when the rating
agencies had entered into a contract with the company to rate
investments in exchange for compensation. 104 The court focused
on this special relationship between the parties and found that
the rating agencies owed a duty to the company to rate invest-
ments accurately.105 Since the ratings were intended to provide
"benefit and guidance" to the company, the court concluded
that the rating agencies were subject to potential liability for
negligently supplying this information and could be liable for
resultant economic losses if demonstrated on remand. 106 The
court noted a crucial distinction between the case at hand and
Jefferson County School District v. Moody's Investor's Servic-
es.107 In Jefferson County, Moody's published an unsolicited ar-
ticle discussing the school district's financial conditions and
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94
P.3d 106, 110 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
101. See id.
102. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rat-
ing Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 15.
103. See Commercial Fin. Serus., Inc., 94 P.3d at 109-12.
104. Id. at 108.
105. Id. at 110, 112.
106. Id. at 112-13.
107. Id. at 110 (contrasting case at hand with Jefferson County Sch. Dist.
v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999)).
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remained uninvolved in its activities. 108 Thus, the rating agen-
cy owed the plaintiff no duty and the court applied First
Amendment protections to its rating. 109 Such a distinction
may be crucial in future litigation.
As described above, California Public Employees Retire-
ment System v. Moody's.110 is one of the first of what will likely
be numerous lawsuits brought against the rating agencies for
their role in the subprime mortgage crisis. The court's approach
for determining the applicability of First Amendment protec-
tions is crucially important in the case, as the decision will like-
ly set the tone for future litigation involving the rating agen-
cies. Thus, the ruling in the CalPERS case could significantly
affect both the ratings industry and millions of investors.
II. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES SHOULD NOT BE
ENTITLED TO FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The issue at the center of many cases involving a rating
agency's liability for inaccurate ratings is whether the First
Amendment shields the agencies from certain tort claims. One
line of cases, marked by County of Orange v. McGraw Hill
Co.111 and In re Enron,112 indicates that this constitutional pro-
tection is appropriate. However, because the rating agencies do
not perform normal journalistic functions, courts should not af-
ford them constitutional protections reserved for the press. This
Section analyzes the constitutionality of rating agencies seek-
ing protection under the First Amendment.
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
DISTINGUISHING THEM FROM THE TRADITIONAL MEDIA
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press."113 In order to gain the protec-
tion of the First Amendment, rating agencies insist that their
ratings are purely opinions produced as the result of their pri-
mary newsgathering function and thus are pure speech under a
108. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 850.
109. See id. at 856.
110. CalPERS Complaint, supra note 51.
111. County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Co., 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Ca. 1999).
112. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d
742 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
113. U.S. CONST. amend I.
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constitutional analysis.114 The judiciary has agreed with this
characterization to a certain extent and erroneously given
heightened protection to the agencies' so-called opinions. 115
Courts that have used the actual malice standard in cases
involving rating agencies have crossed "the line between speech
unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately
be regulated" as described by the Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan.116 Although commercial speech warrants First
Amendment protection, 117 the agencies' credit ratings do not
reach the echelon of fundamentally protected speech. However,
many courts have still bestowed First Amendment protections
upon Moody's, S&P, and Fitch and thus shielded them from
liability for their inaccurate ratings. 118
Most courts find that there is no automatic, absolute First
Amendment protection for the rating agencies.1 19 Yet many
have found a qualified protection and exempted the agencies
from liability.120 These courts have found the inaccurate ratings
to be constitutionally protected opinions or an extension of the
journalist's privilege. 121 Both of these characterizations are
overly simplistic and ignore the true nature of the agencies'
work.
Several features distinguish the agencies' ratings from or-
dinary publishers' news pieces and editorials. First, the major
rating agencies receive payment from the issuer of the rated se-
curity to write their opinion,122 whereas most journalists do not
114. Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securiti-
zation of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 124-25 (2008).
115. See In reEnron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2dat 825.
116. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)).
117. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 562-63 (1980) (finding that commercial speech is not wholly outside the
protection of the First Amendment); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (finding that commercial speech occupies a "subordi-
nate position in the scale of First Amendment values").
118. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
119. See, e.g., id. at 819 ("[A]n examination of the specific facts and cir-
cumstances of a credit rating agency's report is necessary to determine the ex-
tent, if any, of First Amendment protection it should receive.").
120. See, e.g., id.; County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Co., 245 B.R. 151, 160
(C.D. Ca. 1999).
121. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (citing what the
court claimed "to be a policy of heightened protection for credit reports under
the First Amendment" in allowing the credit rating agencies to use the de-
fense).
122. See Schwarcz, supra note 102, at 15.
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receive compensation from their subjects.123 Second, the rating
agencies' activities associated with assisting the structuring of
a transaction, in contrast with rating a complete transaction
after issue, are far more involved than ordinary journalistic ac-
tivities.124 Finally, law and the financial markets value the
agencies' ratings more than mere opinions and treat them in-
stead as a "certification" or "benchmark" of transactions.1 25
Courts should recognize these differences as significant in the
upcoming litigation arising out of the residential mortgage-
backed securities crisis and not award the rating agencies First
Amendment protection reserved for bona fide journalists.
1. Credit Rating Agencies Receive Compensation from the
Issuers They Rate
The first major distinction between rating agencies and
traditional journalists is compensation arrangements. While
not "free speech," commercial speech warrants First Amend-
ment protection.126 Cases may turn on the issue of whether the
agency had been asked by the issuer to rate its securities and
then received payment for the ratings.127 Traditionally, rating
agencies earned their revenues from subscriber fees paid by in-
vestors, much like readers pay for a newspaper or magazine
subscription.12 8 The system changed in the early 1970s, as the
agencies altered their business model and started charging the
issuers of securities for their rating services.129 Today, the ma-
jor rating agencies derive a majority of their revenues from fees
charged to issuers. 130 Thus, the rating agencies have become, in
123. Kettering, supra note 57, at 1690.
124. See Partnoy, supra note 23, at 664.
125. Cf. Jonathan M. Barnett, Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and
Other Transactional Curiosities, 33 J. CORP. L. 95, 139 (2007) (discussing certi-
fication practices and credit agencies).
126. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 562-63 (1980).
127. See, e.g., Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94
P.3d 106, 110 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (holding that the First Amendment did
not protect Moody's when it had been paid for the rating); cf. Jefferson County
Sch. Dist. v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc. 175 F.3d 848, 860 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the First Amendment was applicable when Moody's had neither
been asked to rate the bond nor paid for its services and plaintiff failed to al-
lege a provably false statement).
128. Hill, supra note 30, at 50; Rhodes, supra note 23, at 308-09.
129. Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organ-
ization Analysis, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM, supra note 28, at 41, 47.
130. See Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, FED.
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a practical sense, agents of the issuer, paid to speak on the is-
suer's behalf.131
Courts are taking note of this relationship. The Commer-
cial Financial Services court analogized Moody's rating of as-
set-backed securities, to which it did not afford First Amend-
ment protections, to a traditional journalist's work.132 It found
that, although a journalist's speech might be protected, a dif-
ferent standard applies if a company has been hired to rate the
securities. 133 The courts have not conclusively decided the role
of issuer payment in the rating agencies' First Amendment de-
fense, but they appear to be more sympathetic when the agency
issues unsolicited ratings and not just those for which it is
paid.134 Some courts based their decisions in part on the fact
that some rating agencies rate all issuers, regardless of pay-
ment. In these cases, the courts are more likely to afford them
First Amendment protections, as was the result in In re Pan
Am.135
In a recent report examining Moody's, S&P, and Fitch, the
SEC noted the many problems inherent in the issuer-pays
model.136 The rating agencies' interest in generating business
from the issuers can conflict with the investors' right to receive
accurate reports on credit risk.137 This finding further supports
the theory that receiving compensation from the issuer that the
agency is evaluating should weigh against providing First
RES. BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV., Summer-Fall 1994, at 1, 4, available at http://www
.newyorkfed.org/research/quarterly-review/1994v19/v19n2articlel .pdf; see also
Roy C. Smith & Inco Walter, Rating Agencies: Is There an Agency Issue?, in
RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note
28, at 289, 298-301 (describing the three major rating agencies).
131. See Smith & Walter, supra note 130, at 289-91; see also Jill E. Fisch
& Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation
of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1080 (2003) (proposing a theory of agency
for securities analysts).
132. Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc., 94 P.3d at 110.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc.
175 F.3d 848, 860 (10th Cir. 1999) (allowing the First Amendment to protect
Moody's); see also Partnoy, supra note 23, at 711 (arguing that "credit rating
agencies should not have their cake and eat it too" by benefiting from ratings-
dependent regulation and simultaneously receiving First Amendment protec-
tions from misrepresentation claims).
135. Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 161 B.R.
577, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing that S&P did not merely provide ratings to
issuers who paid a fee).
136. 2008 SEC REPORT, supra note 44, at 23.
137. Id.
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Amendment protections for the agency's subsequent ratings.
Courts should carefully consider this critical distinction be-
tween the rating agencies and traditional media in the upcom-
ing residential mortgage-backed securities litigation.
2. Credit Rating Agencies Are Involved in the Structuring of
Transactions
A second major difference between rating agencies and
traditional media is the significant role the agencies play in
some of the transactions that they cover. The agencies often
work with issuers to rate a deal before it is complete in order
for it to receive the desired rating, specifically in cases of struc-
tured-investment vehicles like residential mortgage-backed se-
curities. 138 Courts have not conclusively ruled on this issue, but
they have been less willing to grant free speech protection
when the rating agency played an active role in structuring the
transaction. 139 For example, the In re Fitch court found that
Fitch's relationship with the issuer was "not typical of the rela-
tionship between a journalist and the activities upon which the
journalist reports."140 Such a high level of involvement is ex-
tremely unusual for the traditional media; significant and con-
tinued involvement with financial institutions to structure se-
curities should strongly weigh against affording the rating
agencies protections reserved for the press.
The ratings process also indicates that rating agencies dif-
fer significantly from the media. The issuer asks the agencies
to rate its new security and pays for this service. 141 In order to
retain the issuer's business, agencies often downplay credit risk
or inflate ratings, and issuers have the option of appealing rat-
ings with which they are dissatisfied.142 Both procedures sub-
stantially contributed to the residential mortgage-backed secur-
ities problem.143 Commenting on the issuer-pays model, one
138. Kettering, supra note 57, at 1691; see also Partnoy, supra note 23, at
664 ("These transactions indicate that the agencies are selling something oth-
er than the information associated with a particular rating.").
139. See, e.g., In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2003).
140. Id.
141. See Partnoy, supra note 23, at 652-54.
142. Id. at 652.
143. Rousseau, supra note 12, at 629. Downgrades became nearly impossi-
ble to make. See Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sar-
banes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory
Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 342 (2003) (arguing that issues
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expert stated: "It would be like cattle ranchers paying the De-
partment of Agriculture to rate the quality and safety of their
beef."144 Similarly, a journalist may submit his work to an edi-
tor, but the subject of the piece does not have the opportunity of
appealing publication if he or she is dissatisfied with the piece's
content or to receive a more favorable portrayal in the finished
product.
The major rating agencies are not principally engaged in
newsgathering.145 They claim that their core business is finan-
cial publishing, but they participate in the structuring of com-
plex transactions with their clients.146 Such business practice is
far removed from traditional journalism. It also proved to be a
conflict of interest particularly devastating in the residential
mortgage-backed securities crisis. 147 Therefore, agencies active-
ly involved in such structuring should not receive First
Amendment protections in upcoming litigation.
3. The Market and the Law Regard the Ratings as
"Certifications" or "Benchmarks"
A third main distinction between rating agencies and tra-
ditional press is that the financial market and the law value
the rating agencies' ratings more than they do opinions and re-
gard the ratings as a "certification" or "benchmark" of a trans-
action rather than an opinion regarding the transaction.148 The
agencies consistently rely on the argument that their reports
are mere opinions, and courts have been apt to agree with this
"capture" rating agencies and prevent them from reporting a downgrade, a so-
called nuclear bomb).
144. The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Financial Mar-
ket: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov-
ernment Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th
Cong. app. at 70-71 (2007) (statement of J. Kyle Bass, Managing Partner,
Hayman Capital Partners, L.P.).
145. See, e.g., In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d at 109.
146. Turmoil in the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Sean J.
Egan, Managing Dir., Egan-Jones Rating Co.) ("[D]ebt issuers invite some or
all of the major rating agencies to preview the collateral pools so the rating
agencies can provide preliminary rating indications that can be used to size
the bond classes and structure the bond transactions.").
147. See id.
148. See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like
Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS 59, 88 (Yasuyuki Fuchita &
Robert E. Litan eds., 2006) (describing an opinion as a recommendation
whereas a certification is far more influential than mere advice).
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assessment. 149 In explicit disclaimers, the rating agencies
maintain that rating creditworthiness is not "an exact
science."150 They argue that evaluation involves interpretive
skills that result in reports that produce unverifiable state-
ments of opinion.151
The Supreme Court has not rigidly defined "opinion."152 It
rejected "an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and 'fact'
when determining whether First Amendment protections
should apply. 153 The Court found that "a statement of opinion
relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a
provably false factual connotation will receive full
constitutional protection." 15 4 In other words, if a statement
"cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts,"155
it is shielded by the First Amendment. As factors to consider in
the determination of whether a statement can reasonably be
interpreted as one of fact, the court may examine the language
employed-whether it is "loose, figurative, or hyperbolic
language" uncharacteristic of facts. 15 6 It may also examine the
context in which the statement was made and the "general
tenor of the article."1 57 This flexible standard has naturally led
to varying viewpoints on whether the credit ratings are facts or
opinions.
A recent SEC report reached a different conclusion than
the courts in County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Company and
149. But see Assessing the Current Oversight and Operations of Credit Rat-
ing Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 109th Cong. 50 (2006) (statement of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law,
University of San Diego School of Law) ("Credit ratings are not merely opi-
nions, any more than fairness opinions of investment banks, audit opinions of
accounting firms, legal opinions of attorneys, buy/sell ratings of securities ana-
lysts, or even the certifications of financial statements made by CEO's and
CFO's are mere opinions.").
150. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d
742, 822 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
151. For example, S&P's Rating Services stated that "[a] Standard & Poor's
credit rating represents Standard & Poor's opinion as of a specific date on the
creditworthiness of an obligor." Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, State-
ment of Standard & Poor's on Credit Rating Agencies to the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (Nov. 15, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/extral
credrate/standardpoors.htm.
152. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990).
153. Id. at 19.
154. Id. at 20.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 21.
157. Id.
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In re Enron, finding the agencies' ratings to be mere opi-
nions.158 The SEC had previously noted that the market "seems
to value the agencies' ratings mostly as a certification (invest-
ment grade versus non-investment grade) or as a benchmark
(the ratings trigger in agreements) and not as information."1 5 9
The SEC had also described how the law relies on rating agen-
cies, an indication that "their ratings are not the equivalent of
editorials in the New York Times."160 Hundreds of regulations
have incorporated credit ratings, creating a statutory depen-
dence on them.16 1 Thus, SEC positions support the position that
the ratings are not mere opinions.
Finally, disclaimers should not protect the rating agencies
from liability, because they do not do so in analogous situa-
tions. For example, a lawyer issuing a title opinion does not re-
ceive an automatic exemption from all related liability because
he called it an "opinion."162 In such cases, courts must closely
examine statements in the context in which they were made. 163
The Commercial Financial Services court compared the rating
issued at the request of an issuer to an audit opinion issued by
a certified public accountant at the request of its client. 164 It
stated that, "[w]hile the Rating Agencies gave 'opinions,' they
did so as professionals being paid to provide their opinions to a
client."16 5 Courts should recognize these comparable profes-
sional examples when determining if credit ratings are in fact
opinions.
The SEC commentary and some recent decisions, including
In re Fitch, show that the rating agencies are not entitled to the
same treatment that the Supreme Court has afforded tradi-
158. See 2008 SEC REPORT, supra note 44, at 7.
159. Partnoy, supra note 31, at 89 n.104 (citing FINANcIAL OVERSIGHT, su-
pra note 58, at 124). The agencies' business depends on the high market value
of their ratings, so although they issue disclaimers, they do not actively at-
tempt to diminish the significance of the ratings in the industry. See id. at 49.
160. Id. at 89 n.104.
161. Id.; see also Partnoy, supra note 23, at 690 ("[R]atings have been in-
corporated . . . in various substantive areas, including securities, pension,
banking, real estate, and insurance regulation.").
162. See Great Plains Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dabney, 846 P.2d 1088,
1092 (Okla. 1993).
163. See id. at 1091.
164. Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106,
110 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
165. Id. But see Jefferson County School Dist. v. Moody's Investor's Servs.
Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that the information was not
guaranteed to be accurate and asserting that Moody's ratings are opinions).
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tional media. 166 In the case of the residential mortgage-backed
securities, courts should carefully examine the agencies' ratings
to determine if they are more similar to opinions or more like
"certifications" or "benchmarks" heavily relied upon by the fi-
nancial market.
In sum, the judiciary has given rating agencies excessive
latitude with their ratings; this latitude surpasses the appro-
priate constitutional limits of the First Amendment. The ac-
tions of Moody's, S&P, and Fitch in rating residential mort-
gage-backed securities gives rise to a number of difficult
questions as to whether the member-of-the-press defense prop-
erly applies and will likely generate contentious litigation in
the future. The best way to resolve this issue is for courts to in-
corporate the In re Fitch factors in their determination as part
of a modified-liability standard.167 If courts maintain the status
quo, claimants will be unable to hold rating agencies accounta-
ble for their role in the subprime mortgage crisis. Without a
new standard, the agencies will have little incentive to discon-
tinue their destructive practices.
III. APPLICATION OF A HEIGHTENED INRE FITCH
STANDARD TO DETERMINE IF FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS ARE WARRANTED
Inflated ratings from Moody's, S&P, and Fitch boosted in-
vestment in residential mortgage-backed securities, and inves-
tors lost billions of dollars as a result. 16 8 However, this fact
alone should not make the agencies automatically liable in up-
coming litigation. Future cases should adopt a standard based
on the In re Fitch test in order to determine if a rating agency
should be treated as a member of the media and if its rating is
an opinion deserving the constitutional protections reserved for
the press. As set forth in the Second Circuit opinion, a First
Amendment analysis involving rating agencies should consider
agency compensation and examine the level of involvement the
rating agency has in the transaction it is rating. 169 This Note
proposes that courts take the In re Fitch test one step further
and add a third prong that analyzes the "certification" or
"benchmark" quality of the rating. This final prong represents
the third major distinction between the rating agencies and
166. See In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2003).
167. See id. at 109-10.
168. See NANTO, supra note 3, at 11 fig.2.
169. In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d at 109-11.
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traditional media and is an essential addition to the Second
Circuit's test. If the agencies fail to meet this heightened In re
Fitch standard, they should not be entitled to the protection of
the actual malice standard in upcoming subprime litigation.
A. THREE-PRONG TEST: RATING AGENCY COMPENSATION,
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT IN STRUCTURING THE TRANSACTION,
AND OPINION VERSUS CERTIFICATION OR BENCHMARK
The appropriate standard for a rating agency using the
First Amendment defense requires three prongs. To meet the
first prong, a rating agency must not have been paid to rate the
transaction at issue.170 Like the traditional media, it must re-
port on all noteworthy transactions and maintain a standard
practice of covering more than just its clients. 171 A rating agen-
cy that rates most public securities issues, regardless of com-
pensation, would meet this prong of the test.172 A nonpayment
prong ensures that the agency's decision to disseminate infor-
mation is a judgment based on newsworthiness rather than
solely on its clients' needs. 1 7 3
The second prong requires a rating agency to demonstrate
that it took a passive role in the planning of the transaction at
issue.174 An agency that is active in the preparatory stages of
transactions and closely involved with the companies it rates
strays from the traditional role of a journalist.175 Making rat-
ings criteria available to the subjects of the rating in order for
the issuers to arrange the transaction in a favorable manner
weighs against the award of First Amendment protections. 176
170. Id. at 109-10.
17 1. Id.
172. See id. at 110.
173. Id.; cf. Schwarcz, supra note 102, at 15-17 (discussing the "conflict of
interest inherent in the way ratings agencies are paid").
174. In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d at 110. The 2009 amendments to the SEC
rules address this prong and were proposed to prohibit an NRSRO from rating
an issuer after it has made recommendations regarding the issuer's activities.
See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organ-
izations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59342, 74 Fed. Reg. 6456, 6474 (Feb. 9,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/34 -59342fr.pdf ("The
amendments to Rule 17g-5 will prohibit an NRSRO from issuing or maintain-
ing a credit rating where the NRSRO or an affiliate provided recommenda-
tions on the structure of the transaction being rated . ); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.17g-5 (2009).
175. In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d at 110.
176. Id. at 110-11; Partnoy, supra note 23, at 664-68 (providing an over-
view of "ratings-driven transactions").
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This second prong ensures that the rating agencies are not as-
sisting in the structuring of securities which the market relies
on them to objectively rate. 177
To meet the third prong, a rating agency must show that
its reports are more akin to an opinion than to a "certification"
or "benchmark." This criterion may be difficult for the rating
agencies to meet, as the market perceives the agencies' reports
as factual, verifiable information rather than opinions, despite
the agencies' explicit disclaimers. 178 Moreover, the law, "in
hundreds of laws and statutes," views their ratings as certifica-
tions or benchmarks. 79 Investment-grade ratings are a prere-
quisite for many mutual and retirement funds, 180 so their
standing is elevated from the level of an editorial to an industry
stamp of approval.181 Inclusion of this third factor is necessary
because it closes a loophole that allows agencies to avoid liabili-
ty for their mistakes.
To properly assess rating agencies' use of the First
Amendment defense, courts must rely on all of the factors in
the heightened In re Fitch standard. The Sixth Circuit ignored
the first factor in its analysis and solely relied on the undis-
puted fact that Moody's was a "public figure" in Compuware v.
Moody's Investors Services to reach the erroneous conclusion
that Moody's was entitled to the actual malice standard in de-
fense of its allegedly inaccurate downgrade of Compuware.182
The court essentially failed to consider issuer compensation in
its analysis and only discussed the issue of agency participation
in the building the transaction.183 This relaxed standard (a test
without a nonpayment prong) would allow ratings agencies
that do not publish unsolicited ratings to qualify for media pro-
tections. The third prong has a broader scope than the first two
prongs, but it is necessary to account for the substantial value
177. See In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d at 106.
178. See Morgenson, supra note 9, at B5. (quoting Rep. Henry A. Waxman).
179. Partnoy, supra note 31, at 89 n.104 (quoting FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT,
supra note 58, at 126).
180. See Cantor & Packer, supra note 130, at 5 (explaining that mutual
and pension funds place limits on the amount of a portfolio that can be in-
vested in noninvestment-grade securities and bonds).
181. Barnett, supra note 125, at 96 (identifying ratings agencies as a mem-
ber of a group of "certification intermediaries" which provide "stamps of ap-
proval").
182. Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520,
525-26 (6th Cir. 2007).
183. Id. at 526-27 (describing how Compuware had the opportunity to re-
view Moody's ratings before they were issued).
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the market places on the ratings. The rating agencies have
made huge profits from the financial market's dependence on
their certifications of quality, 184 so they should be held account-
able for their failure to meet industry expectations.
B. APPLICATION OF THE HEIGHTENED INRE FITCH TEST IN
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES LITIGATION
The heightened In re Fitch test is an appropriate standard
by which to judge the viability of First Amendment defense
claims that Moody's, S&P, and Fitch are likely to raise in Cali-
fornia Public Employees' Retirement System v. Moody's and fu-
ture litigation based on inaccurate ratings of residential mort-
gage-backed securities. In California Public Employees'
Retirement System v. Moody's, the plaintiffs allege that the
three major rating agencies assigned the highest ratings to res-
idential mortgage-backed securities that did not merit the AAA
grade.186 Like similar funds of its kind, CalPERS relied heavily
on the agencies' ratings because the fund required certain hold-
ings to be investment grade.186 Thus, the plaintiff alleges that
the failure to properly rate the securities contributed to its bil-
lion-dollar loss. 8 7
The rating agencies will have difficulty claiming the First
Amendment defense if the California court uses the In re Fitch
factors, especially if the court adopts the third prong proffered
by this Note. In the recent past, Moody's, S&P, and Fitch have
all followed the practice of only rating transactions for which
they were paid.' 88 Thus, the first factor of the In re Fitch stan-
dard, the issuer-compensation prong, weighs against affording
the rating agencies First Amendment protections. Moody's,
S&P, and Fitch also had significant, active involvement in the
structuring of the residential mortgage-backed securities. 89
Hence, the second factor of the In re Fitch standard, the issuer-
level-of-involvement prong, weighs against affording the agen-
cies journalistic protections. Finally, the third factor proffered
184. See Paley, supra note 1, at Al, A8.
185. CalPERS Complaint, supra note 51, at 1-2.
186. See Bell, supra note 52; Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Legal and Economic
Issues in Litigation Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis (Harvard John
M. Olin Center for Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 612,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096582 (describing the invest-
ment-grade requirement and similar litigation involving other funds).
187. CalPERS Complaint, supra note 51, at 1; see also Bell, supra note 52.
188. White, supra note 129, at 47.
189. See Kettering, supra note 57, at 1691.
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by this Note, the opinion-versus-certification-or-benchmark
prong, also opposes the agencies, because investment-grade rat-
ings were required by the fund.190 Therefore, the ratings should
not be viewed as opinions but rather as a certification, and the
agencies should not be entitled to First Amendment protection.
The rating agencies are facing years of contentious litigation
and will likely fight the application of the In re Fitch test, but it
is currently the best means of determining the viability of their
First Amendment defense.
Applying the heightened In re Fitch standard to residential
mortgage-backed securities litigation involving the rating
agencies will not cause permanent damage to the financial
market or freedom-of-speech jurisprudence.191 The Supreme
Court observed that the speech at issue in cases involving rat-
ing agencies "is solely motivated by the desire for profit,
which. . . is a force less likely to be deterred [by regulation]
than others."192 The Court further stated that "the market pro-
vides a powerful incentive to a credit reporting agency to be ac-
curate, since false credit reporting is of no use to creditors."193
Therefore, the Court found "any incremental 'chilling' effect of
libel suits would be of decreased significance."194 The speech at
issue in these cases reflects an unsettled area of law that needs
clarification and reform. The heightened In re Fitch test is a vi-
able solution that could accomplish these goals without nega-
tively affecting freedom of expression.
CONCLUSION
The judicial system should hold rating agencies accounta-
ble for their role in the subprime mortgage crisis. The fallout
from the crisis has been severe; its impact is wide ranging and
190. See Bell, supra note 52.
191. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) ("[C]ommercial speech may be more dura-
ble than other kinds . . . there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper
regulation .... ).
192. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762
(1985).
193. Id. at 762-63.
194. Id. at 762. But see Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Moody's Investor's
Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 856 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[O]ne commentator has
concluded that the tort of negligent misrepresentation should not be extended
to [rating agencies]: 'Courts cannot constitutionally allow recovery on any
showing less than recklessness because of the potential chilling effect that im-
posing a negligence standard would have on rating publications."' (quoting
Husisian, supra note 82, at 460)).
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most likely long lasting. Mortgage lenders, investment banks,
and companies that purchased subprime mortgage securities
can be expected to be held responsible for their role in the fi-
nancial market disaster, so the rating agencies should not es-
cape liability by hiding behind a First Amendment shield to
which they are not entitled.
Although Moody's, S&P, and Fitch have been successful in
defending past suits using the First Amendment, courts should
not ignore the major differences between the rating agencies
and the traditional press. The three major rating agencies are
paid by the issuers, take an active role in the structuring of
transactions, and their ratings are more akin to certifications
than opinions. The Second Circuit set out a standard that ad-
dresses these distinct characteristics of the rating agencies in
the In re Fitch case. A factor considering the use of a rating as
a "benchmark" or "certification" rather than as an opinion
would enhance the In re Fitch test and make it a sagacious
standard for future use. The three prongs of this heightened In
re Fitch standard are appropriate guidelines for the upcoming
litigation involving the rating agencies' grossly inaccurate rat-
ings of residential mortgage-backed securities, and the court
should focus on them in California Public Employees' Retire-
ment System v. Moody's and in other future litigation.
Even if the legislative branch strengthens ratings regula-
tion, Moody's, S&P, and Fitch should not escape liability for the
irreparable damage that they have already caused the global
financial market. A heightened In re Fitch test is the first step
toward bringing the rating agencies to justice. Such a standard
will not result in complete restitution to the millions of inves-
tors devastated by the unscrupulous and self-serving actions of
the rating agencies, but the standard will hold the agencies ac-
countable for their disappointing performances and force them
to take on greater responsibility for their ratings. The story of
the credit rating agencies does not have to be a failure.
1672009]
